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Abstract 
 
This study examines the productivity growth of the nationwide banks of China and a 
sample of city commercial, banks for the eleven years to 2007. Estimates of total 
factor productivity growth are constructed with appropriate confidence intervals, 
using a bootstrap method for the Malmquist index. The study adjusts for the quality of 
the output by accounting for the non-performing loans on the balance sheets of the 
banks and tests for the robustness of the results by examining alternative sets of 
outputs. The productivity growth of the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) is 
compared with the joint-stock banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). The 
results show that average total factor productivity for the joint-stock banks was better 
than that of the state-owned banks for some models of measurement but not others. 
But the average city commercial banks improved its productivity growth both in terms 
of frontier shift and efficiency gain throughout the whole period. The study also 
shows that individual state-owned and joint-stock banks did improve their 
productivity growth and defined an improving production frontier. Most other banks 
lagged behind so that the gap between the inefficient banks and the most efficient 
banks widened. While individual banks improved their productivity growth there is no 
evidence that the average productivity growth of Chinese banks as a whole improved 
in the run-up to WTO.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Banking sector reform in China has been a gradual and on-going process since 
1978. A further stage of reform was announced in 1993 with the objective of creating 
an efficient commercial banking sector. Following the conditions of the WTO, the 
Chinese banking market has been open to foreign competition since the end of 2006. 
Chinese banks have been encouraged to allow foreign banks and investors to take 
minority shareholding positions. The listing of four of the big five banks on the 
international exchange during 2006-7 is supposed to usher in, not only foreign capital 
but also foreign managerial expertise to improve bank management, performance and 
productivity. Given the acceptance of larger stakes by foreign banks in the smaller 
commercial banks (to a specified limit of 25% share); it is no surprise that Chinese 
bank productivity has become a popular topic of research in recent years.  
There have been a number of studies of Chinese banking productivity that 
have been published in Chinese scholarly journals
1
, but to date only a few studies are 
available to non-Chinese readers
2
.  The gradualist reforms of the banking sector and 
the potential of foreign competition would be expected to improve efficiency and 
productivity in the banking sector. Evidence of improved performance has begun to 
emerge. 
This paper is an exercise in measurement. It attempts to measure the 
productivity of the commercial banks in China for the period 1997-2007. Two issues 
are addressed in this paper, namely measurement and modeling strategy. First, the 
measurement of output (and input) of banks is not a simple matter. We therefore 
consider several alternative measures of output as a means of obtaining robust results. 
Second, we use the Malmquist index of total factor productivity (TFP) as a means of 
                                                 
1
See the appendix for a full list. 
2
 A recent exception is a study using non-parametric methods by Matthews et al (2009) and parametric 
methods by Kumbhaker and Wang (2007) 
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translating inputs and outputs into a measure of productivity growth (TFP). The 
Malmquist index has the advantage of being able to decompose productivity growth 
into technological change which captures any expansion in the production frontier, 
from efficiency improvement, which captures the movement towards the efficient 
frontier.  
One of the problems associated with this approach is that it is constructed 
within the framework of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA), which is a non-parametric 
linear programming method that applies observed input and output data to create a 
‘best practice’ frontier. The main drawback of the DEA approach is that it assumes 
the inputs and outputs are measured without error and therefore do not permit 
statistical evaluation.  This paper aims to provide an inferential capability to the point-
estimates of productivity through the use of non-parametric bootstrapping methods.  
This paper poses the four following questions. What has been the total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth of Chinese banks over the period 1998 – 2007? What have 
been the driving factors in TFP growth? Has there been a significant improvement in 
TFP growth in the second half of the period consistent with an increase in the pace of 
reform prior to the opening up of the banking market according to the WTO treaty.  
Finally, what is the effect on the measurement of TFP if non-performing loans are 
treated as ‘bad’ outputs?  
The paper is organized on the following lines. The next section outlines the 
background to the Chinese banking system. Section 3 discusses the methodology and 
literature relating to the Malmquist method of estimating bank productivity. Section 4 
presents the banking data. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes.  
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2. Chinese Banking 
 In 2007, the Chinese banking system consisted of 8,877 institutions, including 
3 policy banks, 5 large state-owned commercial banks (SOCB), 12 joint-stock 
commercial banks (JSB), 124 city commercial banks (CCB), 29 locally incorporated 
foreign bank subsidiaries and the rest made up of urban and rural credit cooperatives 
and other financial institutions
3
. 
 Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the 
banking sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 1 below 
shows that the ratio of total bank assets to GDP has increased from 125%, in 1997, to 
213% in 2007. The market is absolutely dominated by the four state owned banks, 
although their share of the market has been decreasing steadily through competition 
from the other commercial banks (JSB and CCB).  
 
Table 1: The Chinese banking Market 
Variable 1997 2000 2007 
Total Assets to 
GDP 
125.6% 147.1% 213.4% 
SOB Employment 
 
1,670.4 thousand 1,540.8 thousand 
 
1,492.1 thousand 
SOB Market share 
% assets 
88.0% 71.4% 53.2.0% 
NPL ratio SOB 
only 
52.7% 31.5% 2.4% 
ROAA SOB* 0.93% 0.78% 1.12% 
NIM SOB* 1.8% 1.5% 2.6% 
Cost-Income Ratio 
SOB* 
48.2% 59.6% 40.7% 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Individual Bank Annual Accounts, China Regulatory 
Banking Corporation Annual Report, Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, Fitch-Bankscope data 
base, National Bureau of Statistics of China, * weighted average by asset share. 
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 CBRC Annual Report 2007 
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Return on average assets (ROAA) and net-interest margins (NIM) of the SOCBs are 
respectable by western standards but are well below levels that would be consistent 
with economies in the same stage of development (as for example India where NIM 
would be in the region of 3.5%). Part of the reason is that interest rates were heavily 
controlled during this period and the remaining reason is the large amount of non-
performing loans on the books of the commercial banks. The non-performing loans 
(NPL) ratio of the SOCBs has been falling from 52% in 1997 to around 2% in 2007.  
With the encouragement of the regulatory authorities, Chinese banks have in 
recent years, had to restructure their balance sheet, develop modern risk management 
methods, improve capitalization, diversify earnings, reduce costs and improve 
corporate governance and disclosure
4
.  
   Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under 
the government and its agencies
5
. Under state control, the banks in China served the 
socialist plan of directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference 
rather than commercial imperative. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial 
institutions were allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of 
individual Chinese banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution
6
, the pressure 
to reform management, consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and 
reduce unit costs has increased with greater foreign exposure. Table 2 shows the 
extent of foreign strategic investment in individual Chinese banks.  
 The theory of market contestability (Baumol, 1982) suggests that incumbent 
banks will restructure weak balance sheets, reduce costs, and improve efficiency in 
preparation for the threat of entry. In their annual report on foreign banks in China, 
                                                 
4
 CBRC Annual Report 2006 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/index.jsp 
5
 According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under 
the control of the government in 1995. 
6
 There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single 
investor, except in the case of joint-venture banks. 
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Pricewaterhouse-Coopers
7
 refer to the China Bank Regulatory Commission report on 
the opening up of the banking sector. The CBRC divide the pace of reform and 
innovation into three stages; 1980-1993, 1993-2002 and 2003-2006. In the third stage, 
more of the domestic banking business was opened up to external competition. 
Foreign banks were allowed to expand RMB business from the four major cities of 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian which existed at the time of accession to the 
WTO, to the rest of the country. RMB business activity was extended from foreign 
enterprises and individuals to cover domestic firms and residents. Quantitative 
restrictions on foreign banks RMB liabilities were lifted and capital requirements 
were brought into equality with domestic banks. Various restrictions on branch 
development were removed and branches were particularly encouraged in the under-
banked geographical regions outside the east coast. The upshot of these and a number 
of other reforms is that Chinese banks should exhibit less inefficiency, and strong 
productivity improvements in this period, with marked improvements in the latter 
years as competition with foreign banks intensify. 
                                                 
7
 Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2007) 
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Table 2: Foreign Bank Ownership Stake 
Chinese Bank Foreign Bank  Stake – first acquisition 
 
Bank of Beijing 
 
ING  19.2% - Oct 2005 
Bank of Shanghai HSBC (8%) and other 
foreign institutions 
18.0% - Dec 2001 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
Citigroup(4.6%), Barclays, J 
P Morgan, Morgan Stanley 
5.3% -  Dec 2002 
Tianjin City Commercial 
Bank 
ANZ 20% - Dec 2005 
Industrial Bank Hang Seng (12.8%), Tetrad 
Ventures 
20.8% - Dec 2003 
Bank of Communications HSBC (19.9%), Barclays, J 
P Morgan,  
21.5% - June 2004 
Xian City Comm. Bank Scotia Bank  
 
12.4% - Sep 2002 
Jinan City Comm. Bank C Bank of Australia  
 
11% - Nov 2004 
Shenzen Develop. Bank  Newbridge Capital (17.9%), 
Barclays, Nikko Asset 
Management 
19.3% - Jun 2004 
China Minsheng Bank Fullerton (7.9%), Barclays, J 
P Morgan 
8.9% - Jan 2005 
Hangzhou City Com Bank C Bank of Australia  19.9% - July 2006 
 
China Construction Bank Bank of America (8.5%) 
Fullerton, Other foreign 
15.2% - June 2005 
Bank of China RBS-China(8.3%), 
Fullerton, Other foreign 
20.6% - Aug 2005 
ICBC Goldman Sachs, Allianz, 
American Express  
10% - Sep 2005 
Nanjing City Com. Bank BNP Paribas  
 
19.2% - Oct 2005 
China Bohai Bank 
 
Standard Charter Bank 20.0% - Sep 2005 
Guangdong Development 
Bank 
Citigroup (20%), IBM 24.7% - Dec 2006 
Hua Xia Bank Deutsche bank (9.9%) 
Sal Oppenheim Jr 
14.0% - April 2006 
CITIC Bank  BBVA Bank of Spain 5% - Dec 2006  
 
Shanghai Rural 
Commercial Bank 
ANZ 19.9% - Nov 2006 
   Source: Business Week October 31, 2005,  Fitch Bankscope and Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers (2007) 
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3. Methodology and Literature 
Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) can be used to evaluate the efficiency of a firm by 
comparing it with a ‘best practice’ or output efficient firm. An output efficient firm is 
one that cannot increase its output unless it also increases one or more of its input, 
whereas an output inefficient firm is one that can increase its output without 
increasing its inputs. An output efficient firm would have a score of 100% as being 
located on the output efficient frontier whereas an output inefficient firm would be 
inside the frontier and have a score of less than 100%. Similarly an input efficient 
firm is one that cannot reduce its inputs without reducing its output whereas an input 
inefficient firm can. 
The major drawback of the DEA approach is that the efficiency scores 
obtained from a particular sample are confined to that particular sample and cannot be 
compared with another sample in a different time period. This limitation does not 
allow the measurement of productivity growth, which allows for improvement in 
efficiency as well as technical progress. 
The idea of comparing the input of a decision making unit over two periods of 
time (period 1 and period 2) by which the input in period 1 could be decreased 
holding the same level of output in period 2 is the basis of the Malmquist Index
8
. Färe 
et al. (1994) developed a Malmquist productivity measure using the DEA approach 
based on constant returns to scale. The Malmquist productivity index (M) enables 
productivity growth to be decomposed into changes in efficiency (catch-up) and to 
changes in technology (innovation)
9
.  
                                                 
8
 Grosskopf (2003) provides a brief history of the Malmquist productivity index and discusses the 
theoretical and empirical issues related to the index. For the decomposition of Malmquist productivity 
index, see Lovell (2003). 
9
 A further decomposition can be conducted by separating the change in efficiency into the change in 
pure efficiency x change in scale efficiency. The change in efficiency is constructed under CRS while 
the change in pure efficiency and scale efficiency is constructed under VRS. 
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An illustration using the one input one output case is shown in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Points A and B represent observations in periods t and t+1 respectively. The rays from 
the origin St and St+1 represent frontiers of production for periods t and t+1 
respectively. Relative efficiency is measure in one of two ways. The relative 
efficiency of production of a firm at point A compared to the frontier St is described 
by the distance function dt(yt,xt) = 0a/0b. But compared with the period t+1 frontier 
St+1, it is dt(yt,xt) = 0a/0c. The relative efficiency of production of a firm at point B 
compared to the period t+1 frontier St+1 is dt+1(yt+1,xt+1) = 0d/0e. Compared with the 
period t frontier St, the relative efficiency is dt(yt+1,xt+1) = 0d/0c. The Malmquist index 
(M) of total factor productivity (TFP) change is the geometric mean of the two indices 
based on the technology for periods t+1 and t respectively.  In other words: 
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In their study of productivity growth in industrialised countries, Färe et al (1994) 
decompose (2) for changes in efficiency (catch up) and changes in frontier technology 
(innovation). This can be seen by expressing (2) as: 
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where 
M = the Malmquist productivity index 
Et+1 = a change in relative efficiency over the period t and t+1 (catch-up) 
Tt+1 = a measure of technical progress measured by shifts in the frontier from period t 
to t+1 
When M > 1 it means that there has been a positive total factor productivity 
change between period t and t+1. When M < 1 it means that there has been a negative 
total factor productivity change.  
The use of the Malmquist method of evaluating productivity performance of 
banks has been a growth area of academic enquiry. Berg et al (1992) examined 
Norwegian banks 1980-89 and found productivity regress prior to deregulation and 
strong productivity gains due to catch-up after deregulation. The Malmquist 
decomposition was used by Wheelock and Wilson (1999) to examine bank 
productivity in the USA for the period 1984-93. They report a general drop in average 
productivity caused by failure to catch-up with outward shifts of the production 
frontier.  Alam (2001) found that the deregulation period resulted in a productivity 
surge in the first half of the 1980s followed by a productivity regress in the second 
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half for large US banks. These results were confirmed by Mukherjee et al (2001) who 
also uses panel estimation to explain productivity growth in terms of bank size, 
product-mix and capitalisation.  
Other studies of bank productivity using the Malmquist method have been Drake 
(2001) for the UK, Grifell-Tatjéand Lovell (1997) for Spain, Canhoto and Dermine 
(2003) for Portugal, Noulas (1997) for Greece, Fukuyama (1995) for Japan,  and Isik 
and Hassan (2003) for Turkey. A pan-European study was conducted by Casu et al 
(2004) who compare parametric with the Malmquist method. There finding is that 
productivity growth in European banking has been largely brought about by 
technological change rather than efficiency improvement. Outside Europe, 
Worthington (1999) finds that Australian Credit Unions exhibited strong 
technological progress after deregulation and Neal (2004) found that productivity 
improvements were mostly shifts in the frontier with the majority of banks having 
negative catch-up over 1995-99. 
The productivity of Chinese banking has also been the subject of numerous 
studies by Chinese scholars. Chen (2002), Zhang and Wu (2005)  and Tang and Wang 
(2006) use the Malmquist method to examine the productivity trend of Chinese banks 
over the 1994-1999, 1999-2003 and 1997-2003 periods respectively. Their basic 
findings were that the large state-owned banks exhibited lower average growth 
compared with the joint stock banks. In general average productivity growth was 
dominated by catch-up rather technical innovation but that there had been in a marked 
improvement in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in the latter years
10
. In contrast Ni 
and Wan (2006) found strong productivity improvement led by technical 
improvement rather than catch-up, whereas Sun and Fang (2007) pose the question, 
                                                 
10
 See also Hou (2006) which uses a two-stage panel estimation to explain productivity but 
inappropriately uses operating expenses as an explanatory variable when it is also an input in the 
construction of the M index. 
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whether foreign banks have stimulated an improvement in Chinese bank productive 
efficiency? Sun and Fang (2007) find that average TFP improved during the period 
2001-2004 consistent with the hypothesis that the threat of entry has had significant 
efficiency effects on incumbent banks. Appendix A provides a brief tabulated 
summary of studies of bank productivity uses the Malmquist method. 
However, all these studies are limited by the lack of statistical inferential 
capability and therefore it is difficult to evaluate the sensitivity of the estimates 
obtained relative to sample variation. In other words, the deterministic estimates of 
the Malmquist index cannot assign confidence levels to the measures of growth. The 
estimates obtained in the above studies represent measures of performance relative to 
an estimate of the true but unobserved frontier. Since these estimates are based on 
finite samples, they will be subject to sampling variation of the frontier and subject to 
finite sample bias. The bootstrap reduces finite sample bias and reduces, or even 
eliminates finite sample errors in the rejection probability of statistical tests (see 
Horowitz, 2001). 
 Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999, 2000) propose a smooth bootstrapping 
methodology to examine the sensitivity of the DEA scores and Malmquist indices to 
sampling variations with the aim of assigning confidence intervals.       
The application of bootstrapping methods to the Malmquist productivity index 
remains an ongoing area of research (Lıthgreen and Tambour, 1999). Relatively few 
studies have applied bootstrapping methods to measuring banking productivity. 
Gilbert and Wilson (1998) calculate confidence intervals for estimates of productivity 
in Korean banks in 1980-94 and conclude that the period had experienced significant 
productivity growth against the null hypothesis of no change between periods. 
Tortosa-Ausina et al (2008), applies bootstrapping to Spanish savings banks over 
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1992-1998 and confirm the common finding that productivity growth is dominated by 
technological progress in the post deregulation period. Murillo-Melchor et al (2005) 
conduct a European wide study of bank productivity over the period 1995-2001 using 
bootstrap techniques. They confirm the basic finding of Casu et al (2004) that 
productivity gains were driven by technological progress but find significant 
differences in inter-country performance
11
. 
 
4  Banking data 
This study employs an unbalanced panel of annual data (1997-2007) for the 5 state-
owned or state-controlled commercial banks (SOCB), 9 joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCB) and 49 city commercial banks (CCB). The total sample consisted of 323 bank-
year observations. The main source of the data was Fitch/Bankscope, and individual 
annual reports of banks.  
Two approaches are normally taken in determining what constitutes bank 
input and output. The intermediation approach developed by Sealey and Lindley 
(1977) recognises the main function of the bank is to conduct financial 
intermediation. Under the intermediation approach, bank assets measure outputs and 
liabilities measure inputs.  In contrast, the production approach recognises that the 
bank provides intermediation services and payment services to depositors. In the 
production approach, physical entities such as labour and capital are inputs while 
deposits are a measure of output
12
. Goldschmidt (1981) argues that deposits are both 
inputs and outputs depending on its use in intermediation services or payments 
services and suggests a weighting mechanism similar to the divisia approach of 
                                                 
11
 Alam (2001) also uses bootstrap confidence intervals to provide ain inferential capacity to the point 
estimates of productivity of large US banks. 
12
 Freixas and Rochet (1997) propose a third approach that recognises the specific activities of banks 
such as risk management and information processing.  
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Barnett et al (1984). Such a separation would need information about the term 
maturity of deposits. This information is not easily available for banks in China and in 
any case up until very recently deposit interest rates were regulated and did not reflect 
market fundamentals.  
A further issue is the problem of non-performing loans which have been 
treated as an undesirable output in a number of studies. Park and Weber (2006) 
consider loans less non-performing loans (NPLs) as well as deposits as a valid output 
of the bank in their study of bank productivity in Korea, where NPLs are viewed as an 
undesirable output. Stripping out non-performing loans from the stock of loans for 
each bank creates a new output variable which replaces the stock of total loans and 
following Scheel (2001) we treat the inverse of NPLS as a positive output
13
.  
Another argument for adjusting loans for NPLs is to mitigate the effect of the 
large loan portfolios held by the SOCBs on the efficiency calculation. The unadjusted 
loan portfolio would bias the efficiency score upwards for the SOCBs which have the 
largest share of loans but also the highest proportion of NPLs.  
Finally, a variant of the production approach is to recognise that the services 
provided to depositors and loan obligors are reflected in the net flows of income to the 
bank. So services to the consumers of banking products whether it is intermediation 
services or other financial services, will be reflected in the net interest earnings to the 
bank and net non-interest earnings. 
In this study, we adopt a hybrid between the intermediation and production 
approaches. We also recognise that deposits may be viewed as an output or as an 
input. We therefore consider five types of models, which can act as boundaries for the 
intermediation and production approaches including undesirable outputs. Model 1 is 
                                                 
13
 See Thanassoulis (2008) for a discussion. 
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one where there are three inputs; bank deposits and borrowed funds, fixed assets and 
operational costs, and three outputs; total loans, other earning assets, and non-interest 
income. Although non-interest income remains undeveloped in China, it is selected to 
reflect the growing contribution of this area to banks’ total income. Model 2 separates 
NPLs from Loans and treats NPLs as an undesirable output. Model 3 recognises 
deposits as an output and Model 4 allows deposits as an output and treats NPLs as an 
undesirable output. Model 5 has only fixed assets and overheads as inputs but has net 
interest income and non-interest income as outputs. Model 5 is the closest to the 
concepts of the neo-classical production function which uses stocks of capital and 
labour to produce a flow of output. In this study overheads acts as a proxy of labour 
and the outputs are the revenues generated from balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
business, which also subsumes the lower gross interest income generated by NPLs. 
Table 3 summarises the input/output structure of each model. 
Table 3: Model structure 
Model 
Type 
Inputs Outputs 
1  Deposits (RDEP), Overheads  
(ROHD), Fixed Assets (RFA) 
Loans (RLOAN), Other earning 
assets (ROEA), RFEE (net fee 
income) 
2 Deposits (RDEP), Overheads  
(ROHD), Fixed Assets (RFA) 
Loans less NPLs (RPLOAN), Other 
earning assets (ROEA), RFEE (net 
fee income), RNPLs as undesirable 
output  
3 Overheads  (ROHD), Fixed 
Assets (RFA) 
Loans (RLOAN), Other earning 
assets (ROEA), RFEE (net fee 
income), Deposits (RDEP) 
4 Overheads  (ROHD), Fixed 
Assets (RFA) 
Loans less RNPLs (RPLOAN), 
Other earning assets (ROEA), RFEE 
(net fee income), RNPLs as 
undesirable output,  Deposits 
(RDEP) 
5 Overheads  (ROHD), Fixed 
Assets (RFA) 
Net interest earnings (RNIE), net fee 
income (RFEE) 
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As an indicator of scale and evolution of the variables over the period, Table 4 
presents the summary statistics of the input and output data by bank group for 1999 as 
representative of the first half of the period and for 2007 as representative of the 
second half. Since we are examining the movements in productivity over a period of 
nine years, the nominal values of data were deflated by the consumer price index.  
Table 4: Output-Input Variables 1999 and 2007 (million RMB) per bank/year 
deflated by the consumer price index 1997=1 
Variable Description Bank Group Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
RLOAN Stock of loans SOCB 
 
JSCB 
 
CCB 
142078 
2505421 
48577 
386374 
11239 
18264 
783544 
986477 
25186 
141514 
9611 
28563 
29024 
979895 
16643 
194756 
4420 
553 
2464455 
3464731 
80603 
590849 
33094 
138379 
ROEA Stock of other 
earning assets 
SOCB 
 
JSCB 
 
CCB 
685486 
2496702 
42189 
313253 
11875 
17879 
370853 
1146125 
24770 
133885 
13207 
33616 
224289 
873945 
15157 
116718 
2024 
1254 
1210672 
4025218 
74369 
568532 
38144 
172276 
RFEE Net fees and 
commissions 
SOCB 
 
JSCB 
 
CCB 
1664 
19834 
78 
1691 
11 
35 
3496 
10308 
67 
1648 
10 
64 
0 
6403 
15 
407 
1 
0 
7910 
31032 
177 
5811 
28 
277 
RNPL Non-
performing 
loans 
SOCB 
 
JSCB 
 
CCB 
642448 
203324 
8232 
8496 
1388 
359 
411000 
300511 
9834 
3750 
880 
749 
50705 
20482 
0 
4136 
370 
4 
1090038 
738243 
31372 
16922 
2792 
3947 
RDEP Deposits and 
other sources 
of funds 
SOCB 
 
JSCB 
 
CCB 
2063133 
4655574 
86105 
616877 
23308 
32960 
1097080 
1956532 
44388 
265686 
23520 
57493 
31830 
1709734 
34818 
233158 
5328 
2682 
3249698 
7016662 
140688 
1094492 
69579 
281241 
RFA Fixed assets SOCB 
 
JSCB 
 
CCB 
44935 
62260 
2360 
4574 
440 
307 
24472 
22907 
951 
2006 
237 
462 
4856 
29060 
930 
1800 
122 
11 
67995 
88802 
3795 
7620 
778 
2516 
ROHD Overhead and 
other non-
interest costs 
SOCB 
 
JSCB 
 
CCB 
25822 
63999 
1339 
7649 
391 
324 
12960 
27516 
677 
3014 
3259 
457 
6164 
19420 
584 
3894 
116 
23 
38031 
84296 
2616 
13225 
1013 
2278 
RNIE Net interest 
earnings 
SOCB 
 
JSCB 
 
CCB 
40192 
150729 
2214 
21112 
859 
936 
21769 
49225 
978 
11803 
659 
1424 
844 
88490 
957 
8669 
297 
5 
64969 
202585 
3913 
48866 
1615 
6760 
Sources: Fitch/Bankscope, Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various) and author calculations from web sources. 
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The groups represent collectively the five state-owned or controlled banks 
(SOCB), the joint stock commercial banks (JSCB), and the city commercial banks 
(CCB).  
The table highlights the rapid growth in the average loan book over this 
period, particularly for the SOCBs and JSCBs.  The table also shows the decline in 
the average level of NPLs for the SOCBs in the eight years between 1999 and 2007. 
In part this represents the transfer of tranches of NPLs from the big-4 to the Asset 
Management Companies in 1999-2000 and in 2003. It also shows that the average rate 
of decline of NPLs by the CCBs were relatively faster. The figures for the CCBs are 
not strictly comparable between the two periods given the unbalanced nature of the 
sample. While the summary statistics for the SOCBs and JSCBs are comparable, the 
number of CCBs in the sample for 1999 was 9 whereas in 2007 it was 43. 
 
 5.0 Empirical Results 
Positive productivity growth is measured by an estimate greater than unity. 
Productivity regress is indicated by an estimate of less than unity. We conduct three 
exercises in the measurement of bank productivity. First we estimate the standard 
Malmquist measure based on the deterministic Data Envelope Analysis, however this 
will be a biased estimate. Second, a bootstrap estimate of the median of 2000 
bootstrap simulations is examined. Third, where the estimate of productivity growth is 
not significantly different from unity as given by the 95% confidence intervals of the 
bootstrap, the figure is constrained to the null of unity.  
The purpose of constraining the median estimate to the null is to differentiate 
between the ‘classical’ approaches to statistical measurement from the ‘Bayesian’ 
approach. The classical approach would suggest that if an estimate was not 
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significantly different from the null, the null is not rejected, whereas the Bayesian 
philosophy would suggest that the point estimate of the median is appropriate because 
of the frequency of its occurrence. In reality there was little numerical difference 
between the unconstrained and unconstrained estimates. In this particular case, the 
methodological difference between the classical and Bayesian approaches do not 
produce estimates are distinct from each other. However, for completeness we report 
both results. 
In all three cases a constant returns to scale technology was assumed. If the 
production technology is variable returns to scale (VRS), the Malmquist TFP index 
can be further decomposed into frontier shift, pure efficiency change and scale 
efficiency
14
. The bootstrap algorithm of Simar and Wilson (1999) uses the conical 
hull of the observed data to estimate the production set, which amounts to assuming 
CRS. However, the Malmquist index provides consistent estimates of the true value 
irrespective of the returns to scale assumption but may give inconsistent results 
regarding the sources of productivity in the decomposition
15
.   
Table 5 shows the sample mean of the weighted (by group asset share) 
average of TFP and decomposition for each of the five models discussed above using 
the three alternative estimates;  
• the unconstrained median bootstrap value  
• the median bootstrap value constrained to the null of zero growth 
(index = unity) if the null is not rejected 
• the pure DEA estimate. 
 
                                                 
14
 See also Ray and Desli (1997) 
15
 In a previous study looking at the productivity growth of the national banks of China for a shorter 
time period Matthews et al (2009) used the third test of Banker (1996) on selected years and found that 
the null of CRS could not be rejected. 
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Table 5: Weighted annual average of productivity growth 1998 - 2007 
Model Group Bootstrap 
Unconstrained 
estimates 
Bootstrap 
Constrained  
estimates 
DEA standard linear-
programming 
estimates 
 TFP Tech  Catch-
up 
TFP Tech  Catch-
up 
TFP Tech  Catch-
up 
SOCB 0.997 1.046 0.996 0.997 1.040 0.994 1.005 1.035 0.974 
JSCB 0.975 0.994 0.970 0.969 0.989 0.953 0.980 0.987 0.961 
1 
CCB 1.038 1.019 1.018 1.043 1.023 1.065 1.015 1.010 0.994 
SOCB 0.992 1.102 0.946 0.996 1.092 0.924 0.997 1.085 0.923 
JSCB 1.052 1.085 0.999 1.051 1.060 0.982 1.032 1.048 0.973 
2 
CCB 1.294 1.087 1.352 1.317 1.015 1.320 1.027 1.029 1.003 
SOCB 1.006 1.113 0.949 1.004 1.115 0.953 1.009 1.099 0.948 
JSCB 0.952 0.974 1.009 0.952 0.974 0.990 0.967 0.983 0.982 
3 
CCB 1.008 0.979 1.216 1.014 1.000 1.172 1.021 0.993 1.018 
SOCB 0.996 1.133 0.935 0.993 1.142 0.945 1.008 1.213 0.935 
JSCB 1.038 1.053 1.008 1.036 1.032 0.986 0.999 1.024 0.957 
4 
CCB 1.340 1.048 1.339 1.342 1.016 1.328 1.033 1.011 1.008 
SOCB 1.054 1.095 0.936 1.055 1.073 0.950 1.053 1.142 0.941 
JSCB 1.019 0.979 0.977 1.016 0.964 0.975 1.022 1.029 0.966 
5 
CCB 1.085 1.206 0.976 1.074 1.209 0.978 1.109 1.146 0.956 
 
The TFP productivity growth is decomposed into technical progress and 
efficiency gains (catch-up) for each of the models.  A number of points can be made 
about the results of Table 5. First, the results are qualitatively similar for all three 
estimates but the bootstrap results are markedly different quantitatively from the DEA 
estimates, indicating significant bias in the raw DEA results
16
. Second, the SOCBs 
have had significant TFP regress over this period and only moderate growth in the 
case of model 3, where deposits are considered as an output and NPLs an undesirable 
output.  Third, in general the main driver of TFP growth for the national banks has 
been technical progress defined by the ‘best practice’ banks. In most cases the best 
practice (benchmark) banks have shifted the frontier outwards leaving the average 
banks behind and further to catch up. However, the main driver of TFP growth for the 
CCBs has been catch-up (models 2, 3, and 4). Technical progress as the driver of TFP 
                                                 
16
 Appendix C provides an example of the magnitude of bias correction for two models in the case of a 
single year 2006/7, however the frequency of the bias varies from year to year.  
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is particularly pronounced in the case when NPLs are treated as an undesirable output 
(models 2 and 4). Fourth, the bootstrap estimates show strong TFP growth for the 
CCBs and unlike that of the other two bank groups, also strong efficiency gains 
(catch-up). This means that the CCBs are converging on each other (peer group) at a 
faster rate than the SOCBs and JSCBs are within their own groups. Finally, the results 
show that the TFP growth of the CCBs and JSCBs was higher relative to SOCBs in 
the case of Model 2 and 4 where NPLs are treated as undesirable outputs but that the 
technical innovation was stronger in the SOCBs. The reason for this is possibly 
because the distribution of NPLs is concentrated in the state-owned banking sector but 
also that the best practice banks in this group have had strong success in reducing 
their NPL ratios thus reducing their bad output at a faster rate. 
 Using the unconstrained estimates, charts 1a – 1c show the decomposition of 
TFP growth for the three banks groups within each model. 
Chart 1a 
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Chart 1b 
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Chart 1c 
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Chart 1a shows that TFP growth for the SOCBs have been at best moderate (model 5) 
and at worse negative. A similar picture emerges in the case of the JSCBs with 
moderate growth measured by model 2 and 4 and productivity regress measured by 
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models 1 and 3. Spectacular growth has been measured for the CCBs with all five 
models. Chart 1b shows strong measured innovation effects defined by the best-
practice banks that have worsened the relative positions of the rest in the group. The 
SOCBs have on average performed particularly well by measuring strong technical 
innovation effects in all five models. It is likely that the benchmark banks have 
provided a better service to depositors and therefore attracted more than the non-
benchmarks banks in the group and have succeeded in reducing NPLs at a faster rate. 
The benchmark banks have also defined shifts in the frontier by recording strong 
technical innovation when output is defined as the real revenue flows. A less striking 
but similar picture emerges for the JSCBs particularly when NPLs are treated as an 
undesirable output (Models 2 and 4).  
However, the striking picture is what emerges for the CCBs. Strong TFP 
growth is driven by moderate innovation effects (excepting model 5) and spectacular 
efficiency gains (catch-up), suggesting that simply emulating best-practice without 
strong innovation was sufficient to generate strong productivity gains in the CCBs. 
The average for all 5 models for each bank group is an indication of a robust measure 
of overall TFP growth and its drivers. 
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Chart 2 
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Chart 2 shows that taking all five models to obtain a robust measure, TFP 
growth by the SOCBs and the JSCBs has on average been zero but productivity 
growth of the CCBs has been 15% a year. However this verdict belies sharp 
differences in the drivers between the bank groups. In the case of the SOCBs, 
technical innovation has been equally offset by regress in efficiency. This means that 
the best practice SOCBs have shifted the frontier widening the gap between them and 
the remaining SOCBs.  A similar but much more moderate picture emerges for the 
JSCBs. With the CCBs both technical innovation and efficiency gains contribute to 
the strong TFP growth. However, efficiency gains dominate suggesting that emulating 
the best practice banks have contributed the most to productivity growth.  
The boundary is made up of the benchmark or best practice banks. The banks 
that make up the benchmark and define the extent of technical innovation may change 
from year to year and by model. However, it is instructive to identify the benchmark 
banks within each bank group as the bank that has the most frequent display of 
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technical innovation and with highest average growth due to technical innovation. 
Table 6 below presents the benchmark banks for each bank group. 
 
Table 6: Best Practice Banks 
Bank 
group 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
SOCB Bank of 
China 
Bank of China Bank of China Bank of 
China 
ICBC 
 Bank of 
Communicati
ons 
Bank of 
Communicati
ons 
   
      
JSB China 
 Minsheng 
China 
 Minsheng 
   
  China  
Merchant 
China Merchant China 
Merchant 
China 
Merchant 
      
CCB Xiamen First Sino 
Bank 
Xiamen Xiamen Shanghai 
 Ningbo Xiamen    
      
 
Increasing deregulation as suggested by the CBRC and the opening up of the 
Chinese banking market post 2006 would suggest that the second half of the sample 
period examined should see a significant improvement in TFP growth. To test for this, 
the sample was split into two periods 1998-2002 and 2003–2007. Table 7 below 
shows the annual weighted average of TFP growth in both periods for all four models. 
 
Table 7: Total Factor Productivity Growth in sub-samples (weighted averages) 
Years Bank 
Group 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
SOCB 1.014 1.001 1.027 0.996 1.138 
JSCB 1.005 1.132 1.018 1.176 1.141 
1998 – 
2002 
CCB 1.047 1.481 0.954 1.359 1.206 
       
SOCB 0.979 0.983 0.984 0.996 0.998 
JSCB 0.946 0.973 0.886 0.899 0.938 
2003  - 
2007 
CCB 1.030 1.107 1.063 1.321 1.007 
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The table shows that the average TFP growth of the SOCBs ranged from 0.1% a year 
to 13.8% a year in the first half of the period but was universally negative in the 
second half. Given that Table 5 indicates the main driver for TFP growth was 
technical progress, this suggests that the benchmark banks had raced ahead leaving 
the other banks in the group with more ground to catch-up, leading to an average 
productivity regress. The results for the first half of the period also confirm the 
standard finding that the JSCBs outperformed the SOCBs, particularly when NPLs are 
treated as an undesirable output. But contrary to the findings of some Chinese 
scholars this performance is not sustained in the second half of the period. The main 
result is that the TFP growth of the CCBs was stronger than both groups of the 
national banks confirming the findings of Ferri (2009) that city commercial banks 
have increased their performance and are challenging the traditional banks.  
Using the distance function method of estimating TFP, Kumbhakar and Wang 
(2007) find that overall TFP growth for the national banks in China over the period 
1993-2002 was 4.5% annually with the SOCBs showing an annual growth of 0.7% a 
year and the JSCBs showing an average growth of 6.1%. The inputs in the 
Kumbhhakar and Wang (KW) study were labour, fixed assets and deposits and the 
outputs were loans and other earning assets. The inputs and outputs in this paper do 
not correspond exactly with the KW study; however model 1 is the closest in 
proximity where overheads act a proxy for labour as a factor production. 
 The results reported in Table 7 does not support the estimates found in the 
KW study although using the different models as a range show that they fall within 
the band. Furthermore, the results do not support the notion that the second half of the 
period saw an improvement in TFP growth. Table 8 shows the result of a non-
parametric test for the differences in the measures of TFP growth between the two 
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periods. There is no strong evidence (at the conventional 5% level of significance) 
that the high productivity growth of the first half of the period was improved on in the 
run-up to the opening up of the banking market to foreign competition. Indeed there is 
weak evidence to the contrary. 
 
Table 8: Difference in performance between two periods 
Model Mann-Whitney z value Probability  
 SOCB JSCB CCB SOCB JSCB CCB 
Model 1 0.38 1.35 -0.39 0.70 0.18 0.70 
Model 2 0.13 1.88* -0.52 0.90 0.06 0.61 
Model 3 0.59 0.76 -1.88* 0.55 0.45 0.06 
Model 4 -.03 1.79* -0.85 0.98 0.07 0.39 
Model 5 0.18 1.33 -0.70 0.85 0.18 0.48 
* significant at the 10% level 
 
 We now turn to an examination of the characteristics of TFP growth as a 
means of identifying the key bank specific components that might explain 
productivity performance. Taking the logarithms of TFP we conduct pooled 
regression.  
The bank specific variables that we used were SIZE measured by the log of 
assets, the cost-income ratio (COST), NPL ratio (NPL) and a measure of revenue 
diversification given by the proportion of fee income in total revenue (FEE). In 
addition we also explored the performance of banks that have a foreign stake-holding 
and we also included a dummy variable to distinguish between the earlier and later 
periods (DUM) and category of bank (JCSB=1 if joint stock bank, zero otherwise and 
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CCB=1 if City Commercial Bank, zero otherwise). All bank specific variables were 
lagged one period to account for potential endogeniety. Table 9 summarises the 
results. 
 
Table 9: Productivity characteristics (pooled regression) – Dependant variable 
ln(TFP). Intercept not shown. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
COST_1 -.0016*** -.0038*** -.0043*** -.004*** -.0012 
Ln SIZE_1 .0138 - .0123* .0129 .0115* 
FEE_1 .5548*** .5166 .7507*** 1.141*** .8399*** 
DUM -.0520*** -.0661* -.0474 -.0666* - 
JSCB .0686 .0555 -.0536* - .0445 
CCB .0383  - - - 
Significance 
of 
Regression 
F(6,316) = 
3.42*** 
F(4,318) = 
4.05*** 
F(5,316) 
= 6.2*** 
F(4,318) = 
4.87*** 
F(4,315) = 
3.26*** 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance 
Two consistent characteristics emerge from this analysis. First, higher TFP 
growth is mostly associated with banks that have lowered their cost-income ratio, and 
have diversified their revenue sources by developing non-interest income. Second, 
there is weak evidence that size measured by total assets is positively associated with 
higher TFP growth.  
The determinants of the decomposition of TFP growth into technical 
innovation (frontier shifts defined by best practice) and efficiency (catch-up) is shown 
in Table 10 below. 
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Table 10: Characteristics of Technical innovation and efficiency growth 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Tech Eff Tech Eff Tech Eff Tech Eff Tech Eff 
COST_1 
 
 ( - ) 
** 
 ( - )  ( - ) 
*** 
 ( - ) 
*** 
 ( - ) 
*** 
FEE_1 
 
( + ) 
*** 
( - ) 
** 
( + ) 
*** 
 ( + ) 
*** 
( - ) 
** 
( + ) 
*** 
 ( + ) 
*** 
( - ) 
*** 
Ln(SIZE)-
1 
  ( + ) 
*** 
( + ) 
*** 
  ( + ) 
*** 
 ( + )  
NPL    
 
( - ) ( + ) 
** 
( - ) 
** 
( + ) 
** 
( - ) 
** 
  
CCB 
 
( - ) 
*** 
( + ) 
*** 
( - ) 
*** 
( + ) 
*** 
( - ) 
*** 
( + ) 
** 
 ( + ) 
** 
( - )  
JSCB   ( - ) 
*** 
( + ) 
*** 
( - ) 
** 
     
DUM      
 
 ( - ) 
*** 
 ( - ) 
*** 
 
Direction showed in parenthesis. *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5% 
   Table 10 shows more clearly that technical innovation is positively associated 
with banks that have diversified their revenue sources by developing non-interest 
income business, whereas efficiency gains (catch-up) has been typically associated 
with banks that have reduced their cost-income ratio. There is also some weak 
evidence that banks have been able to generate catch-up efficiencies by lowering the 
NPL ratio and that size is a positive factor in developing technical innovation. There 
is consistent evidence that efficiency gains are more prevalent with the CCBs than 
with the other two bank groups.  
 
6.0  Conclusion   
This paper has used the Malmquist decomposition to quantify the productivity 
growth of Chinese banks in the period 1998-2007. The advantage of using the 
Malmquist method is that it separates the diffusion of technology (efficiency gains) 
from advances in technology (frontier shifts). The paper also applies bootstrapping 
techniques to evaluate significant changes in productivity, efficiency gains and 
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innovation. Five models were examined to provide a robust measure of bank 
productivity performance.  
In general, average TFP growth has been neutral over the period for the SOBs 
and JSCBs but positive for the CCBs. However, the weighted average figures mask 
wide differences in individual performance. The benchmark banks that define the 
production frontier have generated sharp increases in technical innovation, leaving a 
wider gap between them and the other banks in their respective groups. The CCBs 
showed improvements in both technical innovation and efficiency (catch-up) gains. 
Once NPLs are treated as an undesirable output the picture becomes even 
clearer. On average the SOCBs show productivity regress. Technological gains have 
been swamped by average efficiency regress. However, the JSCBs show strong TFP 
growth driven by stronger innovation effects. While adopting technologies that 
improved the productivity of individual JSCBs, other banks in the group failed to 
keep up with the benchmark banks and slipped back in relative terms. 
The CCBs show strong TFP growth driven largely by efficiency gains but also 
moderate innovation effects. Efficiency gains for all the banks (catch-up) have been 
obtained through cost reduction. Technical innovation is associated with greater 
diversification of revenue away from interest earnings and also in a limited way with 
size of the bank. There is no evidence to support the case that an increase in the pace 
of innovation and reform in the second part of the sample period, or the opening up of 
the Chinese banking market has resulted in an improvement in bank productivity. 
This may in part be due to the fact that foreign banks still only command a small 
share of the banking market in China. It is also possible that domestic competition is 
particularly strong between local banks with CCBs challenging the bigger established 
national banks.   
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Appendix A: Summary of Studies on bank productivity 
Study Country Period Inputs Outputs Results 
 
Berg et al (1992) Norway 1980-89 Labour hours, 
operational 
expenses 
deflated by 
materials price 
index 
Short-term loans, 
long-term loans, 
deposits and loan 
losses treated as 
negative output  
Low TFP growth but strong catch-
up following deregulation. Big 
banks had stronger productivity 
growth than smaller banks. 
Wheelock and 
Wilson (1999) 
USA 1984-93 Labour, 
physical capital, 
purchased 
funds 
Four categories of 
loans, demand 
deposits 
Decline average productivity over 
the period. The benchmark banks 
improved technical productivity 
through technical innovation but 
average efficiency declined. 
Alam (2001) USA 1980-89 Two categories 
of deposits, 
other purchased 
funds, capital, 
labour, equity. 
Securities, three 
categories of 
loans. 
Lag in effect between regulatory 
reform and growth in productivity. 
Improvements in productivity 
obtained from technical innovation 
rather than efficiency gains. 
Mukherjee et al 
(2001) 
USA 1984-90 Labour, 
physical capital, 
equity, two 
categories of 
deposits. 
Three categories 
of loans, 
investments, non-
interest income 
Productivity growth of large banks 
was generally positive in this 
period but productivity growth 
fluctuated with respect to size. 
Drake (2001) UK 1984-95 Physical 
capital, labour, 
(deposits) 
Loans, Other 
investments, Non-
interest income, 
(deposits) 
Uses both intermediation and 
production methods. Productivity 
growth driven by technical 
progress. Slower TFP under the 
intermediation approach. 
Grifell-Tatjé and 
Lovell (1997) 
Spain 1986-93 Labour, non-
labour 
operating 
expenses 
Loans, Savings 
deposits, demand 
deposits (all 
deflated by CPI) 
Savings bank productivity driven 
by technical progress and catch-
up.  Commercial bank productivity 
declined in latter half of period. 
Canhoto and 
Dermine (2003) 
Portugal 1990-95 Labour, 
physical capital 
Loans, deposits, 
securities, 
interbank 
assets/liabilities 
Strong technological progress 
following deregulation. Catch-up 
weakened as benchmark banks 
grew strongly. 
Noulas (1977) Greece 1991-92 Labour, 
physical capital, 
deposits 
Liquid assets, 
loans, investments 
State owned banks experienced 
faster TFP than private banks. 
Catch-up was faster in private 
banks. State-owned banks 
experienced stronger technical 
progress  
Isik and Hassan 
(2003) 
Turkey 1981-90 Labour, 
physical capital, 
deposits 
Short-term loans, 
long-term loans, 
other earning 
assets, non-interest 
income 
Productivity loss 1982-86. 
Productivity growth 1987-90.  
Strong catch-up in 1987-90 
following deregulation but low 
technical progress. 
Casu et al (2004) Europe 1994-00 Wage 
bill/Assets, 
deposits, 
physical capital 
Loans, other 
earning assets, 
non-interest 
income. 
Productivity growth supported by 
technological progress rather than 
efficiency gains, except in the UK 
where catch-up was stronger. 
Worthington 
(1999) 
Australia 1993-97 Labour, 
physical capital, 
non-deposit 
liabilities 
Demand deposits, 
time deposits, 
three categories of 
loans, other 
investments  
Technological regress but high 
variability within credit unions. 
Technical progress occurred after 
deregulation. Efficiency gains due 
to technical efficiency rather than 
scale efficiency. 
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Chinese Studies of Bank Productivity 
Study Period Inputs Outputs Results 
Chen (2002) 1994-99 Physical assets, 
operating expenses 
Deposits, loans, profit Technological regress 
but strong catch-up 
drives TFP. JSB 
exhibited higher TFP 
variation 
Ni and Wan (2006) 1998-02 Labour, physical 
assets, branches, op 
expenses 
Deposits, loans, op 
revenue 
Positive TFP. Joint 
stock banks more 
productive than SOB. 
Productivity growth 
driven by technical 
progress. 
Tan and Wang (2006) 1997-03 Labour, physical 
assets, deposits 
Profit, gross income TFP growth negative 
until final year, driven 
by technological 
regress. Efficiency 
improvements 
Hou (2006) 1996-02 Deposits, physical 
assets, op. expenses 
Interest earnings, non-
interest earnings 
Declining trend in 
technical efficiency. 
TFP driven by 
technological progress 
Zhang and Wu (2005) 1999-03 Labour, non-deposit 
funds 
Deposits, Profits TFP driven by 
efficiency catch-up. 
SOCBs driven by 
technical progress 
Xu and Zhong (2005) 2001-02 Capital, net fixed 
assets, total expenses 
Deposits, loans, profit 
before tax 
Adopted bootstrapping 
method to re-examine 
the efficiency results. 
Capital, fixed assets 
and deposits have 
significant impact on 
bank efficiency, while 
fixed assets, loans and 
profits have no 
significant impact.  
Zou (2008) 1996-05 Deposits, net fixed 
assets, Op. expenses 
Investments, loans FTP driven by 
technical progress. 
Listed banks are more 
efficient than non-
listed. The latter is 
better than SOB. 
Ownership is the key 
factor. Bank size is 
positive correlated to 
technical progress and 
efficiency catch-up. 
Yan (2008) 1995-04 Op. expenses, 
deposits, number of 
staff 
Loans, profits Banking market 
concentration is 
declining, which 
caused bank efficiency 
improvement. 
Competition level is 
positively correlated 
with efficiency,  
Sun and Fang (2007) 
 
 
 
 
1996-04 Interest expenses, 
other expenses, 
operating expenses, 
total assets 
Interest earnings, other 
earnings, profit before 
tax 
From 1996 till 2001, 
TFP was less than 1. 
Foreign banks entry ha 
no significant impact 
on Chinese banking 
efficiency 
improvement. 
2001-04, TFP, TE is 
positive greater than 1. 
As China joined WTO, 
foreign entry has 
limited impact on 
Chinese banking. 
Pang (2006) 2000-04 Deposits, net fixed 
assets 
Loans, investments TFP improved, driven 
by technical progress. 
Size matters.  
Zhu (2006) 2000-04 Labour, net fixed Operating income, net The average TE is 
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assets, deposits income 0.87. SOB less 
productive than JSB. 
TFP decreased caused 
by technical regress. 
Tan and Wang (2006) 1997-03 Labour, next fixed 
assets, deposits 
Income, profits Declining trend in 
efficiency. TFP driven 
by frontier shift. 
Hou and Wang (2006) 1996-02 Deposits, net fixed 
assets, operating 
expenses  
Interest earnings, non-
interest earnings 
TFP is not driven by 
technical progress. 
Ni and Wan (2006) 1998-02 Net fixed assets, 
number of outlets, 
labour, operating 
expenses  
Gross income, 
deposits, loans 
Efficiency improved, 
driven by technical 
progress. Ownership 
matters. 
Zhang and Wu (2005) 1999-03 Net fixed assets, 
labour, loanable funds 
Deposits, profits TFP improved. For 
SOB, driven by AE, 
whilst technical 
progress contributed to 
TFP increase in JSB.  
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Appendix B 
 
The estimates of the distance functions for N banks over 2 periods are obtained 
following the standard method outlined in Färe et al (1992) for ( )titit xyd ,, ,ˆ  and 
( )1,1,1 ,ˆ +++ titit xyd . As in Simar and Wilson (1998) a DGP is assumed whereby the N 
banks randomly deviate from the underlying true frontier in a radial input direction. 
Bootstrapping involves replicating the DGP and generating 1000 pseudo samples 
which are used to measure the distance function for either period for each observation 
in the pseudo sample. This section borrows heavily from Jeon and Sickles (2004) 
 
Step 1: Form (N x 1) vectors [ ]),(ˆ)....,(ˆ),,(ˆ ,,,2,2,1,1 tNtNttttttt xydxydxyd=Α   and 
[ ]),(ˆ)....,(ˆ),,(ˆ 1,1,11,21,211,11,11 +++++++++=Β tNtNttttttt xydxydxyd . The values in A and B are 
bounded from below at unity. 
Step 2: Reflect these values about the boundaries in two-dimensional space to form 
(4N x 2) matrix in partitioned form; 
    












−
−−
−
=∆
B
B
B
B
A
A
A
A
2
22
2
 
The matrix ∆ contains 4N pairs of values corresponding to the two time periods. The 
estimated covariance matrix of the columns [A B] is Σˆ which is the same as that of 
the reflected data [2 – A   2 – B], given by the temporal correlation of the original 
data. The covariance matrix of [2 – A  B] and [A  2 – B] is RΣˆ , where; 
   





=Σ
2
212
12
2
1
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ
σσ
σσ
 and 





−
−
=Σ
2
212
12
2
1
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ
σσ
σσ
R  
Let j∆ denote the jth row of ∆. Then ∑
=





 ∆−
=
N
j
j
j
h
z
K
Nh
zg
4
1
24
1
)(ˆ  is a bivariate 
kernel density estimator of the 4N reflected data points represented by the rows of ∆, 
where K(.) is the bivariate kernel function, h is a bandwidth set to (4/5N)
1/6
 following 
Silverman (1986) and z is (1 x 2) )],(ˆ),,(ˆ[ 111 +++= itittititti xydxydz  is the ith row of the 
(N x 2) matrix of the original distance function estimates. 
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Step 3: Randomly draw with replacement N rows from ∆ to form (N x 2) matrix 
][ ,
*
jiδ=∆ , i=1,2,….N, j=1,2. 
Step 4:  Compute  
   ∑
=
=
N
i
jiNj
1
,
1 δδ , j = 1, 2 
Step 5: Simulate draws from a bivariate ( )Σˆ,,0N  and ( )RN Σˆ,0  by generating iid 
pseudo random N(0,1) deviates ),( 21 zz  s.t. ),( 232211 zlzlzl + from ( )Σˆ,,0N  and 
),( 231211 zlzlzl +− from ( )RN Σˆ,0 . Here 321 ,, lll  are elements of a lower triangular 
matrix 
   





=
32
1 0
ll
l
L  obtained from the Cholesky decomposition of the 
(2 x 2) matrix Σˆ . These simulated draws form ε* which is (N x 2) containing 
independent draws from the kernel function. If *j∆ is drawn from [A B] or [2 – A  2 - 
B], the ith row of ε
*  
is from ( )Σˆ,,0N , but if ε* is drawn from [2 – A B] or [A 2 – B], 
the ith row of ε
* 
is from
 ( )RN Σˆ,0 . 
Step 6: Compute (N x 2) matrix  






+













−+∆+=Γ
−
2.
1.
2.
1.**2
1
2
0
0
0
0
)1(
δ
δ
δ
δ
ε CChh  where C is (N x 1) of 
unit values which gives a (N x 2) of bivariate deviates from the estimated density of ∆ 
and ε
*
 is an (N x 2) containing N independent draws from the kernel function Kj(.). 
Step 7: For each element of ji ,γ  of Γ set; 1,
*
, ≥= jiji γγ  or ji ,2 γ−  otherwise. The (N 
x 2) matrix ][ *,
*
jiγ=Γ  contains simulated distance function values.   
Step 8: Pseudo samples *l  are then constructed by setting 
),(ˆ/,
*
,
*
, ititttijijit xydxx γ= and jitjit yy ,
*
, =  for i = 1, 2, ..N and j = 1,2. 
Step 9: Compute the four distance functions;  
 ),(),,(),,(),,(ˆ * 1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
****
1
***
++++++ itittitittitittititt xydxydxydxyd . Repeat steps 3 to 9 B times to 
get a set of B bootstrap estimates. 
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Appendix C 
Median Values Model 1 - 2007/6 Model 5 – 2007/2006 
2000 bootstraps TFP Boot L-B U-B TFP Boot L-B U-B 
State Owned Banks         
ICBC 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.93 
CCB 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.91 1.01 1.04 0.96 1.14 
ABOC 3.91 2.60* 1.75 3.69 1.12 1.08 1.00 1.12 
BOC 0.97 0.95 0.89 1.00 1.02 1.03 0.98 1.09 
Bank of Communications 3.09 2.03* 1.35 2.80 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.79 
          
Joint Stock Banks         
China Merchant Bank 0.94 0.94 0.88 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.95 1.03 
China Minsheng Bank 0.90 0.87 0.82 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.96 
CITIC 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.91 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.70 
SPDB 0.95 0.95 0.89 1.01 0.91 0.87 0.80 0.94 
IBC 0.74 0.65* 0.59 0.72 0.88 0.84* 0.82 0.87 
EVRBRT 0.89 0.90 0.84 0.95 0.83 0.79 0.72 0.85 
HUAXIA 0.79 0.74 0.68 0.81 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.96 
GDB 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.79 0.78 0.73 0.83 
Shenzhen Develop Bank 0.97 0.99 0.97 1.02 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.95 
          
City Commercial Banks          
BEIJING 0.70 0.75 0.70 0.79 0.70 0.72 0.67 0.75 
SHANGHAI 0.98 0.93 0.87 1.01 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.94 
Shenzhen Pin An 0.86 0.97 0.85 1.12 0.81 0.91* 0.85 0.93 
TIANJIN 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.64 0.70 
NANJING 0.89 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.90 1.00 
DONGUAN 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.84 0.92 0.89 0.83 0.97 
WUXI         
CHONQING 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.81 
XIAMEN 0.97 1.06 0.94 1.21 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.13 
NINGBO 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.98 1.00 0.96 1.05 
XIAN         
WUHAN 0.90 0.95 0.92 0.98 0.83 0.90* 0.85 0.91 
QINGDAO 0.93 1.03* 0.95 1.11 0.76 0.80 0.75 0.84 
JINAN 0.95 1.00* 0.97 1.00 0.76 0.81* 0.77 0.81 
DALIAN 0.98 1.09* 1.00 1.18 0.51 0.57 0.51 0.63 
HANGZHOU 1.01 1.06 0.99 1.14 0.87 0.88 0.83 0.92 
CHANGSA 1.35 1.42 1.33 1.54 0.93 0.98 0.87 1.05 
FSB 0.87 1.00* 0.90 1.09 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.92 
SHIJIAZHUANG 0.96 1.00 0.94 1.05     
SHAOXING 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.89 0.75 0.76 0.73 0.76 
JINZHOU         
LAIWU 0.98 0.94 0.88 0.99 0.73 0.70 0.65 0.73 
JIUJIANG 0.82 0.87 0.77 1.00 0.40 0.46* 0.41 0.52 
PANZHIHUA 0.92 1.03* 0.93 1.10 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66 
DONGYING 0.88 0.80* 0.74 0.86 0.92 0.82* 0.82 0.87 
ZENGZHOU 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.78 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.03 
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WEIFANG 0.90 0.96 0.87 1.07     
UNITED OVERSEAS 1.29 1.42 1.19 1.84     
LINYI 1.02 1.13* 1.05 1.20 1.18 1.20 1.16 1.22 
XINXIANG 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.91 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.88 
LIUZHOU 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.88 0.79 0.79 0.75 0.79 
HUZHOU 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.88 
KARAMAY 0.85 0.79 0.71 0.89 3.44 2.67* 2.27 3.26 
HUANGSHI 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.76 0.77 0.73 0.78 
XUCHANG 0.96 0.97 0.91 1.02 0.97 0.98 0.91 1.01 
JINING 1.02 1.07 1.01 1.12 0.78 0.73 0.67 0.80 
CHENGDE 0.69 0.72 0.65 0.81 0.61 0.60 0.55 0.64 
HENGYANG 1.02 1.12 1.01 1.23 1.40 1.48 1.26 1.68 
GANZHOU 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.85 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.70 
GUILIN 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.83 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 
NIANYANG 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.89 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.80 
JIAOZUO 3.41 1.58* 1.34 1.99 2.78 1.72* 1.21 2.53 
DEYANG 0.77 0.78 0.72 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.87 
ZHEJIANG MINTAI 0.68 0.68 0.62 0.74 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 
ZHEIJIANG CHOUZHOU  0.90 0.93 0.89 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03 
ZHANJIANG  0.81 0.87 0.81 0.92 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.62 
JIAXING 0.93 0.97 0.92 1.01 0.93 0.91 0.83 0.98 
ZHEJIANG TAILONG 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.91 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.82 
WEIHI 0.73 2.00* 1.31 2.85 0.41 0.93* 0.69 1.14 
* indicates significant bias at the 95% confidence interval 
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